Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Truth-makers' and 'Propositions'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
10911 Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10906 Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10907 The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10909 Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
10912 Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
10908 Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
6011 There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]